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At a time of dramatic change in global
strategic and economic structures, it
might be expected that the important
international issues and events of con-
cern to the Pacific Islands in 1992
occurred outside, rather than inside,
the region. The list of potentially sig-
nificant developments was endless: the
continuing strategic shakeout after the
end of the Cold War; the withdrawal of
the United States military from the
Philippines; moves toward free trade
areas in the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and North
America (North American Free Trade
Agreement, NAFTA); developments in
Asia-Pacific economic cooperation;
increased pessimism over the outcome
of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT); changes within the
European Community; and continuing
recession in the West. These develop-
ments, far from determining affairs in
the Pacific, formed only one element in
a more complex equation. As in the
past, developments in regional rela-
tions, and in relations between the
region and the outside world, derived
as much from political and social
change within island societies as from
outside factors.
CHANGING GLOBAL CONTEXT
One striking reflection of the changing
global strategic context was the declin-
ing interest in the region by Russia,
which during the year closed its
embassy in Port Moresby-its only
diplomatic presence in the region. The
effect was negligible, because the
Soviet Union, and subsequently Rus-
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sia, had not been involved economi-
cally or diplomatically in the islands to
any significant degree. The only excep-
tions were the one-off fisheries agree-
ments with Kiribati and Vanuatu,
which were discontinued for economic
reasons before the end of the
Cold War.
The more interesting involvement to
watch was that of Western countries on
whose economic assistance the island
states depend. According to conven-
tional wisdom, such aid is in danger of
falling below its Cold War levels now
that strategic concerns are no longer
present, and as aid funds are diverted
to the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe (see eg, Herr 1993; Elek 1992,
2; Callick 1991). Developments in 1992
support the view that the Pacific
Islands no longer grab the attention
they did during the Cold War, when
foreign leaders frequently visited island
capitals, and political developments in
the islands could be front-page news in
Paris, Canberra, Washington, and
London. Nevertheless, outside powers
retained an interest in influencing
island affairs. In this sense it is "busi-
ness as usual," except the business is
now generally handled by desk officers
rather than foreign ministers. No
reduction in economic assistance to the
region is evident. Even New Zealand,
whose economic stringency has dic-
tated a 3 percent reduction in the total
aid budget for 1992-93, will slightly
increase its assistance to the Pacific
Islands (McKinnon 1992).
French involvement was no excep-
tion to this general trend. France's
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commitment to influencing regional
affairs seemed unaffected by the end of
the Cold War. A policy of integrating
French territories into regional affairs,
financially supporting various regional
programs, and cultivating a less con-
frontational image was pursued vigor-
ously and with considerable success.
However, the end of the Cold War did
create the necessary conditions for a
dramatic departure in French nuclear-
testing policy. In April, the socialist
government in Paris suspended testing
at Moruroa and in January 1993
announced that the suspension would
continue as long as the other major
nuclear powers did not resume their
tests. This decision, greeted with great
enthusiasm in the Pacific (except in the
test-dependent economy of Pape'ete) ,
was made for domestic political rea-
sons (Mitterrand's socialists were los-
ing ground to the French greens).
Although it is not therefore to be seen
as a response to the end of East-West
rivalry, it was a policy shift that would
have been unimaginable without such
change.
The United States renewed its fish-
eries treaty with the Forum island
states, guaranteeing payment of
us$180 million over the next ten years.
The earlier treaty was widely inter-
preted as a product of US Cold War
concerns, an attempt to alter the image
that the United States was riding
roughshod over island economic inter-
ests while the Soviet Union was willing
to pay for fishing access. The new
treaty is an interesting signal of a con-
tinuing commitment after the end of
the Cold War. The United States also
moved to activate the Joint Commer-
cial Commission with the Pacific
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Islands, which, despite teething prob-
lems, aims to promote American
investment in the region and greater
access for island products to the United
States market. It will be based at the
East-West Center in Hawai'i, and will
be responsible to the Pacific Islands
Conference, the governing body of the
Pacific Islands Development Program.
On the Pacific rim, the withdrawal of
the United States military from Clark
Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines
does not reflect a reduction of strategic
interest in the area. The United States
moved during the year to develop a
more flexible and mobile approach to
its Pacific presence, focusing on access
for its ships and planes and pre-posi-
tioned materiel in Southeast Asia, and
building up support bases on Guam
(/DW, 12 Dec 1992, 40).
China and Taiwan continued to
spar for the allegiance of Pacific Island
states. In a move that greatly angered
Beijing, the Honiara meeting of the
South Pacific Forum in July agreed to
institute a regular dialogue with Tai-
wan. This decision reflected the
increasing support for Taiwan among
island states, with Nauru, Tonga, and
Solomon Islands having already for-
mally recognized Taiwan. Others, such
as Fiji and Papua New Guinea, have
close informal relations. The new
Vanuatu government, although not yet
granting formal recognition-notwith-
standing a statement by Foreign Minis-
ter Serge Vohor to the contrary-
moved much closer to Taipei than its
predecessor. In August, for example,
Taiwan sponsored Prime Minister
Maxime Carlot Korman's trip to Buda-
pest to attend a meeting of the World
Anti-Communist League.
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The changing global trading regime
and the increasing regionalization of
approaches to economic matters
caught the attention of Pacific Island
policymakers during the year. They
were generally keen to be part of any
Asia-Pacific regional developments, to
take action to mitigate the effects on
their current trade of the move to lower
tariffs in Australia (which will dilute
the margin of preference for island
products under the South Pacific
Regional Trade and Commercial
Agreement), and to consider the possi-
ble impact of free trade area develop-
ments in ASEAN and North America,
and of a single integrated market in
Europe. More generally, they were
concerned, as were other trade-depen-
dent small players outside major blocs,
with the discussions in GATT which
suggested that world trade might move
toward more, rather than less, protec-
tionism. But none of these develop-
ments affected Pacific Islands trade in
1992. It is simply too early to say what
impact they might have.
Other factors may have more dele-
terious effects on the export-dependent
future now being mapped for island
economies. A central concern will be
how to remain competitive with pro-
duction in China and Southeast Asia.
At what point will the off-shore capital
attracted to island export zones move
on to Asian countries? The opening to
the world market of mineral resources
in the former Soviet Union may have
implications for the attractiveness of
exploiting the resources of Papua New
Guinea, especially if that might involve
such difficulties as have been experi-
enced in Bougainville.
REGIONAL RELATIONS
The institutional framework within
which multilateral relations are con-
ducted appears to have received further
endorsement during 1992. There is a
rough division of labor between the
South Pacific Commission (spc), the
Pacific Islands' Development Program,
the University of the South Pacific, the
Forum Fisheries Agency, the South
Pacific Applied Geoscience Commis-
sion, the South Pacific Regional Envi-
ronmental Programme (SPREP), and the
Forum Secretariat. Their respective
efforts are harmonized through a South
Pacific Organizations Coordinating
Committee. Far from being affected by
a post-Cold War redirection of funds,
this network continued to attract suffi-
cient financial assistance for moderate
growth. The coordination committee
also took bolder steps to rationalize
regional strategies and appeared to
gain more legitimacy as the hub of the
regional institutional network.
The increased acceptance of these
arrangements was reflected in the
absence from regional debate of any
significant support for the alternative
approaches that had dominated delib-
erations for at least a decade: the possi-
bility of merging the South Pacific
Commission with the Forum, or of
strengthening the commission to the
point of competing with the Forum
network in some of the same functional
areas.
The most significant institutional
development was the successful estab-
lishment of the South Pacific Regional
Environmental Programme in Apia
despite the constraints imposed by
POLITICAL REVIEWS
the severe impact of Cyclone Val on
Western Samoa, and the inordinate
demands posed by preparations for the
region's participation in June in the
United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development in Rio. The
environmental program began the year
as a unit in SPC headquarters in
Noumea; by December it was installed
in Apia as a distinct regional institution
with about forty staff. Its budget in
1992 was US$7 million compared with
US$I.5 million in 1990 (SPREP 1992).
The legal changes necessary to estab-
lish its autonomy were delayed by the
United States Government's concern
about the implications of allowing its
territories to become signatories to a
SPREP treaty. This issue remains unre-
solved.
A second development of some sig-
nificance was the institutionalization of
the relatively new interest in promoting
joint action on drug trafficking and
criminal activities in the region. A
Regional Security Committee, com-
prising senior officials from Forum
member countries, met for the first
time in Suva in February. The commit-
tee will act as a focal point for the
activities of various existing regional
networks-the South Pacific Chiefs of
Police Conference, the Customs Heads
of Administration Regional Meeting,
and the Pacific Islands Law Officers
Meeting-each of which may send rep-
resentatives as observers (Barber 1992).
The results of the Suva meeting were
taken up by Pacific leaders at the
Honiara meeting of the Forum in the
form of a Declaration on Law Enforce-
ment Cooperation, covering such mat-
ters as drug trafficking, intrusions by
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foreign criminals, money laundering,
terrorism, and extradition (SPF 1992).
The third major institutional devel-
opment in 1992 was the formation of a
grouping of Smaller Island States, com-
prising Cook Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu,
Nauru, and Niue. The outcome of the
first summit meeting of prime ministers
and presidents, held in Rarotonga in
January, suggests that the group
intends a fairly radical departure from
existing regional programs. The lead-
ers proposed the establishment of their
own regional development bank, joint
negotiations with distant-water fishing
nations and international shipping
companies over access to their com-
bined exclusive economic zones, exam-
ination of the possibility of imposing
fees on the use of their airspace, enter-
ing a consortium for international
investment, and sharing technologies
such as black-pearl farming (PR, 6 Feb
1992,4). A committee of officials of the
Smaller Island States subsequently met
in Tarawa to take these ideas further
and the group caucused in Honiara in
July prior to the Forum meeting.
Even if the particular proposals for
collaboration within the SIS group fail
to eventuate-and the lack of action on
equally ambitious statements of intent
in the case of other subregional group-
ings is not encouraging-the Smaller
Island States have the potential to at
least equal the impact of the Melane-
sian Spearhead Group as a lobby
within the Forum. Although some res-
ervations were raised in Honiara about
the implications for regional unity of
the new subgrouping, the Forum meet-
ing nevertheless endorsed the develop-
ment of the group and directed the
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Secretariat to assist where possible.
Furthermore, the Pacific Islands Devel-
opment Program offered to fund a
meeting for the private sectors of the
five SIS members, and the South Pacific
Organizations Coordinating Commit-
tee urged that Smaller Island States be
regarded as a legitimate category for
the purposes of regional programs.
Robert Rex's farewell speech to the
Honiara Forum marked the end of an
era in regional relations-a passing
from the scene of those of the older
generation of island politicians who
had first met at South Pacific Confer-
ences sometime between 1950 and the
1960s, who had formed the Pacific
Islands Producers' Association in 1965,
and the Forum and its offshoot, the
South Pacific Bureau for Economic
Cooperation in the early 1970s, and
who had continued to hold power in
their countries until recently. The end
of this era was underlined by the deaths
of Hammer DeRoburt in July (Presi-
dent of Nauru in all but a few of the
last twenty-five years), and of Robert
Rex in December (premier of Niue for
the nineteen years since self-govern-
ment); the departure of Ratu Mara
from the prime ministership of Fiji in
May (after twenty-five years of
national and regional leadership); the
end of Prince Tuipelehake's twenty-
two-year term as Tonga's prime minis-
ter; and Governor Coleman's loss of
power in American Samoa.
Leadership in the region has now
passed to a different generation in their
late forties rather than sixties and sev-
enties. Also missing at the regional
table in 1992 were some key players in
the second generation of leaders: Wal-
ter Lini after twelve years as prime
minister of Vanuatu, and Ieremia Tabai
after thirteen years as president of Kiri-
bati (although Tabai has returned in a
new role as Secretary-General of the
Forum Secretariat). Most leaders
attending regional meetings in 1992
had only attended a few meetings; for
many-notably Maxime Carlot Kor-
man of Vanuatu and Sitiveni Rabuka
of Fiji-it was their first direct involve-
ment.
The structure of regional relations
was particularly affected by political
change within Vanuatu and Fiji. For
twelve years Vanuatu, under Walter
Lini's prime ministership, had repre-
sented the radical end of regional poli-
tics as the most antinuclear and the
most anti-French of island countries.
The dramatic change to a franco-
phone-dominated coalition govern-
ment in Vila could have implications
for the Melanesian Spearhead Group,
for whom New Caledonian indepen-
dence is a rallying point, and for the
Forum and its political positions. The
marked difference that a francophone
administration represents for regional
politics was symbolized in Carlot Kor-
man's request that Forum deliberations
henceforth be in French and English.
Political developments in Fiji had a
similar set of implications. Fiji was the
most important player in regional
affairs from the late 1960s until the
coups in 1987. Preoccupied at home
and having fallen out with Australia
and New Zealand, it had a very low-
key role from 1988 to 1991. The first
postcoup election, the acceptance of
the constitutional changes by Australia
and New Zealand, and Rabuka's suc-
cessful debut at the Honiara Forum,
suggest that Fiji is in a position to again
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take its place among the more influen-
tial states in regional politics.
The politics of regional relations
within the South Pacific Commission
focused on housekeeping issues-the
selection of key officers including the
secretary-general, the siting of new
headquarters, and financial manage-
ment and accountability-leaving little
time to debate development problems
or programs. The culmination of the
debate on the site of the headquarters,
which occupied much of the 1991 South
Pacific Conference in Nuku'alofa (see
Fry 1992), came at a special ministerial
meeting at Noumea in March. Asked
to leave their Anse Vata headquarters
of forty-five years (formerly the Ameri-
can headquarters during World War II)
to make way for tourism development,
commission members had to choose
among five proposed sites: Noumea,
Suva, Nuku'alofa, Vila, and Pape'ete.
When they failed to reach a consensus
after two days of debate, the Fijian del-
egate proposed a vote be taken. The
Tongan and French Polynesian propos-
als fell out after the first round; the
Noumea site won out over Suva 16
votes to 7 in the second; the Vila pro-
posal was to be considered only in the
event of a decision to move from
Noumea (PR, 26 March 1992, 1-3).
Voting was along the lines estab-
lished during the heated debate at the
1991 conference and for much the same
reasons. The Noumea site was sup-
ported by the Melanesian Spearhead
countries, most metropolitan countries
and territorial administrations, and of
course, France and New Caledonia.
The members of this highly unusual
alliance (it must have been the first
time that the Melanesian countries and
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France had been on the same side on
any issue) were motivated by a variety
of factors. The Melanesian countries,
the most unlikely supporters given
their opposition during the 1970S and
1980s to the headquartering of the
commission in Noumea, were respond-
ing to FLNKS entreaties to keep it there
as an important part of the Kanak peo-
ple's interaction with other Pacific
Islanders. France presumably thought
it important to retain it on French soil
as part of legitimating the French pres-
ence in the region. Others were con-
cerned to continue the long association
with Noumea, and that the South
Pacific Commission remain indepen-
dent from the Forum and continue to
represent the interests of territorial
administrations. The Suva site, on the
other hand, was mainly supported by
the non-Melanesian independent coun-
tries. Their support was motivated by
relatively high operating costs in
Noumea, anger at the way the commis-
sion had been treated by the French
administration and the Noumea
authorities, and anti-French feeling
more generally.
Although Fiji and its supporters
were unsuccessful in moving the site
away from Noumea, their challenge
resulted in the acceptance of a superior
site. Before the challenge the French
proposal was for a site at Receiving in
the suburbs of Noumea. The proposal
that was ultimately accepted comprises
a beachfront office site at Anse Vata, a
block away from the present headquar-
ters, and a separate site at Receiving
for housing of commission personnel.
The cost of the new headquarters will
be met by France (88 percent) and Aus-
tralia (12 percent). The challenge also
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prompted a more generous subsidy of
operating costs from the local New
Caledonian government. These conces-
sions, which would not have occurred
without the intervention by Berenado
Vunibobo, then Fiji's minister for trade
and commerce, at the Nuku'alofa con-
ference in October 1991, may have
gone some way in calming what had
become very strong feelings on this
Issue.
The other housekeeping issues-
selecting a new secretary-general and
financial management-became inter-
twined at the South Pacific Conference
in Suva in October. Following the
tragic death in early March of Secre-
tary-General elect Jacques Iekawe, two
names were put forward for consider-
ation: Jioji Kotobalavu, formerly direc-
tor of the South Pacific Applied Geo-
science Commission, and Ati George
Sokomanu, former president of
Vanuatu. Kotobalavu withdrew at the
eleventh hour to take up a position as
secretary of the Fiji prime minister's
office. In a closed session the confer-
ence voted 20 to 6 against an Austra-
lian motion to reopen nominations for
the position; consequently Sokomanu
was appointed (with Poloma Komiti
promoted to director of programs and
Fusi Caginavanua as deputy director).
For the metropolitan countries the
appointment was intimately connected
with the financial management of the
South Pacific Commission. Australia's
delegates in particular were reportedly
concerned that given the particular
need at this time for improved financial
management, the appointment deci-
sion be delayed until a broader field
could be found. During debate they
warned that appropriate management
changes would have to be made or
Australia's future extra-budgetary
funding to the commission might have
to be reviewed. This was a dramatic
departure from the low-key approach
usually adopted by Australia, and was
the first time that any government had
threatened withdrawal of funds if its
position was not adopted. It probably
ensured solid island support for Soko-
manu. Australia's stance was inter-
preted by most island delegates as
unacceptable, with their strength of
commitment to what they saw as a
principle overriding any concern that
Australia would carry out its threat.
In an interview with the Fiji Times
after his appointment, Sokomanu
accused Australia of trying to run the
South Pacific Commission as a colonial
club. He asked, "Do we still need peo-
ple to bulldoze us around here or let
Pacific Islanders do their own thing
and show places like Australia and oth-
ers that they can do the job as well as
others?" Sokomanu was later criticized
in the conference report for revealing
the proceedings of in-camera discus-
sions to the press. Australia was also
accused by Papua New Guinea Foreign
Minister John Kaputin of bringing its
tensions with Vanuatu into regional
relations, an accusation dismissed as
"absolute nonsense" by Steve Martin,
the leader of the Australian delegation
(Lakhan 1992).
The collective efforts of the island
states on environmental matters during
1992 focused on developing and push-
ing a regional position within the Asso-
ciation of Small Island States and in
the run up to, and during the United
Nations Conference on Environment
and Development. After the Rio con-
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ference, regional efforts concentrated
on developing a climate change pro-
gram. A strong position was taken on
the Johnston Atoll chemical weapon
destruction facility, with a demand that
it be closed down after the current
burn-off. A surprisingly weak position
was adopted in relation to the Japanese
plutonium shipments, given the con-
cerns of some member states (the
strong opposition to the shipments by
Nauru's President Dowiyogo was
reported on the front page of the New
York Times in October). The Forum
simply urged that appropriate care be
taken, and that permission be sought
for travel through their economic zones
(SPF 1992). Regional programs in areas
such as coastal management and
biodiversity began to take on some
substance with the employment of new
resources at SPREP headquarters.
Collective diplomacy in the eco-
nomic arena focused on developing
links with Asia and, reflecting Forum
wishes, the new secretary-general made
this a priority. In September Tabai
addressed a ministerial meeting of the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Group (APEC) in Bangkok, the first
time the Forum has been granted
speaking rights (although still only as
an observer). On the basis of this expe-
rience, he revealed his intention of
encouraging individual island states to
send representatives on Forum delega-
tions, or to seek APEC membership in
their own right where possible (Garrett
1992a). Tabai also attempted to
develop links between ASEAN and the
Forum. Finally, the legal regime con-
cerned with controlling the operations
of distant-water fishing nations in the
Pacific scored with the signing of the
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Niue Treaty on Fisheries Surveillance
and Law Enforcement (Properjohn
1992). The surveillance regime demon-
strated its effectiveness during the year,
when nine Korean and Taiwanese
boats were suspended from the
Regional Register of Foreign Fishing
Vessels after being sighted fishing ille-
gally in Nauru's waters. The Taiwan
Deep Sea Boatowners and Exporters
Association subsequently made a
financial settlement (PR, 1 Oct 1992, I).
BILATERAL RELATIONS
In addition to influencing multilateral
relations in the region, political
changes in Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua
New Guinea held significant implica-
tions for various bilateral relation-
ships. Most important was the rap-
prochement between Fiji and Australia
and New Zealand following the first
postcoup elections under a new consti-
tution. While both governments had
their reservations about vote weighting
and other mechanisms favoring one
race over another, and one region over
another, they accepted this as the best
solution possible in the circumstances.
They were encouraged in this position
by the acceptance of the new constitu-
tion, and the participation in the elec-
tions, by those parties ousted by the
coups: the National Federation Party
and the Labour Party. Although the
Australian government still talked of
accepting the electoral outcome in the
context of Rabuka's guarantees of
future constitutional revision, some
sense of relief that full relations could
be resumed with Fiji was evident. Fol-
lowing Rabuka's successful meetings
with Prime Ministers Keating and
Bolger at the Forum in July, Australia
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and New Zealand cleared the way for
resumption of defense cooperation.
Australia immediately offered three
(previously cancelled) patrol boats,
and later in the year sent its defense
minister to Suva to discuss the terms of
the restoration of defense links.
Prime Minister Rabuka's visit to
Australia was a diplomatic success.
The impression he gave, of a man of
moderation who was prepared to con-
sider further reforms of the constitu-
tion to make it more democratic, was
somewhat tarnished by subsequent
publicity given to extreme anti-Indian
comments that he allegedly made dur-
ing a television interview for Austra-
lia's Network Ten. It was later
revealed, however, that Rabuka had
been the victim of blatantly dishonest
editing (Garrett 1992b). While in the
original interview he was clearly saying
that the Fiji constitution should be
"totally Fijian-oriented," he did not
express the more extreme views attrib-
uted to him. Using time-honored but
ironic diplomatic behavior, both Aus-
tralia and New Zealand sent warships
to Suva Harbour before the end of the
year to symbolize the full restoration of
friendly relations.
The election of a francophone gov-
ernment in Vanuatu immediately
affected Vanuatu's relations with
France and New Caledonia and, later
in the year, with Australia. Relations
between Vanuatu and France had been
strained since independence in 1980.
The then-governing Vanua'aku Pati
saw France as directly and indirectly
attempting to thwart the move to inde-
pendence and as subsequently interven-
ing in the domestic politics of Vanuatu
by supporting the francophone parties.
The Vanua'aku Pati also had a special
dislike of French settlers in New Cale-
donia, whom they saw as meddling in
Vanuatu's pre-independence ;lOd post-
independence politics. On the other
hand, the French viewed Vanuatu
under Walter Lini as the main regional
supporter of Kanak independence in
New Caledonia. The tensions culmi-
nated in 1987 in the expulsion of the
French ambassador for the second
time. As a consequence in the same
year, France suspended all economic
assistance to Vanuatu.
The new Carlot Korman govern-
ment rapidly mended fences with
France and New Caledonia, making
the first move in January. A ministerial
delegation was sent to New Caledonia
to hold talks with the three provincial
governments. New Caledonia's Terri-
torial Congress voted to give economic
assistance to Vanuatu to provide free
schooling. (Schooling is very political
in Vanuatu, because it is seen as deter-
mining the balance of power between
francophone and anglophone com-
munities over the long term). New For-
eign Minister Vohor indicated during
his visit to Noumea that he would also
like to see a French embassy and a cam-
pus of the French University of the
South Pacific in Port Vila. In February
the Carlot Korman government asked
the French government to assist with
the surveillance of its exclusive eco-
nomic zone (Australia was already
offering assistance in this area). In
March it was announced that the
Vanuatu government would be open-
ing a consulate in Noumea, and the
government also moved to complete a
property agreement with the French
government that would allow both the
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return of a French ambassador to Vila
and the normalization of relations. In
April, Carlot Korman visited Paris (PR
23 Jan 1992, 6; 2 Apr 1992,1,4).
Vanuatu's relations with Australia
took a very different turn. Despite an
early visit to Vila by Foreign Affairs
and Trade Minister Senator Evans,
and a successful return visit to Can-
berra by Carlot Korman, relations
became severely strained in July when
the Vanuatu government expelled Aus-
tralia's acting high commissioner,
James Pearson, on the grounds that he
had interfered in the internal affairs of
Vanuatu. Pearson had publicly
expressed Australia's concerns about
proposed amendments to the Business
Licence Act, which would give the
finance minister the right to refuse or
revoke business licenses without hav-
ing to give reasons (PR, 9 July 1992, I).
In talks with Carlot Korman at the
Honiara Forum meeting, Evans said
that he regarded Pearson's actions as
"ordinary, legitimate, diplomatic
behavior." With matters unresolved by
the talks, Evans subsequently indicated
that the Australian government would
cancel the scheduled visit of two Aus-
tralian warships as part of Vanuatu's
Independence Day celebrations and
would contemplate a further response.
He argued that "when people don't
observe the ordinary rules of diplo-
matic behavior it is necessary to
respond in a way that makes clear
that's the case" (PR, 16 July 1992, 6).
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF THE BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS
Although it did not appear on any offi-
cial regional agenda, the most signifi-
cant international issue in the Pacific
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during 1992 was the "spillover effects"
of the Bougainville crisis. The tragic
events in Bougainville between 1989
and 1991 had already made this the
most serious security problem in the
region since the Second World War.
Despite calls from the Bougainville
Revolutionary Army (BRA) and its sup-
porters for assistance from the outside
world, and concern expressed by inter-
national nongovernment groups such
as Amnesty International and the
Pacific Conference of Churches, the
international community had generally
regarded this as an internal matter for
the Papua New Guinea government.
This position was maintained by the
Forum states in 1992, but it became
increasingly evident that events had
moved well beyond a serious internal
crisis in Papua New Guinea. By year's
end the conflict had severely damaged
Papua New Guinea-Solomon Islands
relations and Australia-Solomon
Islands relations, and called into ques-
tion the future of the Melanesian
Spearhead Group.
At the center of the developing inter-
nationalization of the conflict was the
deterioration of relations between
Papua New Guinea and Solomon
Islands. Although the relationship had
been strained since the beginning of the
crisis, tensions escalated sharply in
1992. In February, Prime Minister Rab-
bie Namaliu sent a formal protest to
Solomon Islands Prime Minister Solo-
mon Mamaloni, accusing his govern-
ment of allowing its territory to be used
by BRA sympathizers "to stage acts of
propaganda and sabotage against our
sovereignty" (PR, 6 Feb 1992, I). This
was largely a response to the entry into
Bougainville, through Solomon
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Islands, of an Australian who set up a
transmitter for Radio Free Bougain-
ville, the establishment of a Bougain-
ville Coordination Office in Honiara,
and the rejection by the Solomon
Islands government of an extradition
treaty proposed by Papua New
Guinea.
Relations between Honiara and Port
Moresby plummeted after the Papua
New Guinea Defence Force in March
carried out a cross-border raid on
Bomana Bay settlement on Fauro
Island, destroying a fuel depot and
burning houses. Although Namaliu
subsequently apologized and claimed
that the raid was not authorized by his
government, he also implied that Solo-
mon Islands had some responsibility
for its occurrence. Such raids could be
avoided, he argued, if Papua New
Guinea and Solomon Islands cooper-
ated on border surveillance. He added
that BRA activities carried out from the
Solomons could easily be interpreted as
a threat to Papua New Guinea's
national sovereignty (PR, 26 Mar 1992,
1,4). In response to the raid on Fauro
Island, Mamaloni broke all contact
with the Namaliu government and
announced that he would boycott the
Melanesian Spearhead Group-due to
meet in Wewak in April-until com-
pensation was received from Papua
New Guinea. He would not discuss the
issue with Port Moresby until after the
Papua New Guinea elections in June
(Garrett 1992C).
At this point, the Mamaloni govern-
ment attempted to engage the interna-
tional community on the issue. Parlia-
mentary delegations toured Pacific
Island countries and Papua New
Guinea, and visited Commonwealth
and Forum headquarters. The govern-
ment asked the Commonwealth Secre-
tariat to revive its mediation efforts. In
response, the secretary-general of the
Commonwealth visited Honiara in
May. He is reported to have said that
he would ask Commonwealth mem-
bers to be sympathetic to requests from
Solomon Islands for assistance in sur-
veillance of the border with Papua
New Guinea (PR, 28 May 1992,4).
The elections in Papua New Guinea
raised hopes of reconciliation between
the two countries, as Paias Wingti in
his election campaign appeared to take
a position on Bougainville that was
more appealing to Solomon Islands. In
the first month after his election as
prime minister in July, events moved
steadily toward a restoration of rela-
tions. Wingti met Mamaloni in
Honiara in late July en route to the
Melanesian Spearhead Group meeting
in Vila. As a result Mamaloni moved
to meet Papua New Guinea concerns,
withdrawing a Solomon Islands pass-
port issued to a prominent member of
the Bougainville Provisional Govern-
ment, Bishop Zale, which listed his
place of residence as "Republic of
Bougainville," and agreeing to an offi-
cial meeting to discuss border surveil-
lance (PR, 20 Aug 1992, 6).
This reduction in tensions was
short-lived. In mid-September the
Papua New Guinea Defence Force
again attacked a Solomon Islands set-
tlement-Komaliae village in the
Shortland Islands-killing two people,
injuring a child, and kidnapping a man
(Waqa 1992). These unauthorized
actions took Papua New Guinea-Solo-
mon Islands relations to rock bottom,
with Mamaloni threatening to sever
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diplomatic ties and to recognize the
BRA and the Republic of Bougainville.
He also blamed Australia for its
defense involvement with Papua New
Guinea, asserting that many Solomon
Islanders were "questioning the sincer-
ity" of the Australian government
"since it is Australia which is supplying
the lethal weapons with which Papua
New Guinea forces are killing Bougain-
villeans and Solomon Islanders" (Honi-
mae r992, 7). In a further response to
the raid, the Mamaloni government
submitted a request to the United
Nations Security Council that it con-
sider sending a mission to examine the
border issue.
Wingti responded quickly to a pro-
test note from Honiara with an apol-
ogy and a promise of disciplinary
action for those involved and compen-
sation for those affected in the Short-
lands. But this did not defuse the
situation. The Solomons government
continued to lobby at the United
Nations for a mission to look at the
border problem and refused dialogue
with Port Moresby. In response to a
letter from Stephen Pokawin, premier
of the Manus provincial government,
requesting that Mamaloni host a meet-
ing of disaffected Papua New Guinea
premiers in Honiara, Mamaloni out-
lined his views on Bougainville and
attacked the roles of the Papua New
Guinea and Australian governments.
He went as far as inviting the premiers
to hold a meeting in Honiara to discuss
the Wingti government's proposal to
dismember Papua New Guinea's pro-
vincial government system (WPR, 1 Dec
1992,2; IBP, Dec 1992, II).
By year's end relations between
Honiara and Canberra were severely
4°1
strained, with Mamaloni cancelling
Australian surveillance flights over the
Solomon Islands' economic zone and
accusing the Australian defense attache
in Honiara of involvement in the PNG
Defence Force raid. He also requested
the withdrawal of the Australian advis-
ers to the Solomon Islands police force.
At the international level, the United
Nations, although initially reluctant to
consider the matter, finally sent a mis-
sion to Honiara. The parliamentary
opposition in Honiara generally agreed
with Mamaloni's concerns over Papua
New Guinea's handling of the Bougain-
ville crisis, and the consequent inter-
vention of the Papua New Guinea
Defence Force in Solomon Islands terri-
tory, as well as the need to seek inter-
national assistance with mediation on
the border dispute, but they parted
ways on the question of Mamaloni's
response to Australia and his refusal to
hold talks with the Papua New Guinea
government.
The tensions between Honiara and
Port Moresby in 1992 marked a depar-
ture in the post-independence relations
of Pacific Island states. This was the
first time such a fundamental rift had
developed between two island coun-
tries. It was also the first time an island
state had thought another to be infring-
ing its sovereignty. In this case, of
course, each thought the other was
threatening its sovereignty. Honiara
accused Papua New Guinea of having
no respect for its border or its citizens
by allowing its defense force to harass
Solomon Islanders in cross-border
raids. Port Moresby accused the Solo-
mon Islands government of allowing its
territory to be used as a base and con-
duit for assistance to a group rebelling
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against the authority of the Papua New
Guinea government. The terms of the
dispute over contending sovereignties
had a familiar and ironic ring: that of
Indonesia-Papua New Guinea rela-
tions from the mid-1970S to the mid-
1980s, with Jakarta claiming that the
Papua New Guinea government was
allowing its territory to be used by
West Papuan separatists, and Port
Moresby concerned about Indonesian
military incursions into Papua New
Guinea territory.
GREG FRY
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